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Abstract 
Quality education is of major public and private interest and, understandably, considerable effort is paid 
to the quality of schools and improvement of the level of education in society. Many governments 
recognize the limitations of centralized policy in motivating school improvement and turn to ‘network 
governance’ to coordinate school systems (Janssens and Ehren, 2016).  Relying on school-to-school 
collaboration to coordinate education systems has far-reaching consequences for existing accountability 
structures, most of which were developed to support hierarchical control of individual school quality. This 
paper reflects on the accountability of networks of schools and on appropriate arrangements to improve 
the effectiveness of partnerships; our contribution starts with unpicking the question of ‘who is 
accountable to whom and for what’ in a network of schools? We discuss some common problems in the 
accountability of networks and describe frameworks to evaluate network-level outcomes and functioning. 
Examples from the accountability of Multi-Academy Trusts in England are included to contextualize our 
contribution. 
1. Network governance 
Quality education is of major public and private interest and, understandably, considerable effort is paid 
to the quality of schools and improvement of the level of education in society. Many governments 
recognize the limitations of centralized policy in motivating school improvement and look for alternative 
models to coordinate their education system. Burns and Koster (2016) describe a set of common trends 
across OECD countries, such as a greater decentralization to allow schools and their authorities to 
respond to local demand, a move away from hierarchical relationships between schools and national 
government to multi-level governance where multiple actors operate and interact at different levels. A 
strong central government is no longer seen as effective in addressing the needs of a global, liquid and 
more interdependent society. As Theisens (2012) explains, the fabric of society has changed profoundly 
with a decreasing influence of traditional institutions, such as political parties, unions and churches losing 
their power, tremendous increase in individual choice and individuals operating in a wide range of 
horizontal professional and social networks. These changes have made centralized coordination from one 
point of contact increasingly complex as the amount of information to process becomes untenable.  
 
Meuleman (2008) describes how these changes resulted in a third form of governance in the 1990s to 
offer a more effective style of coordination than hierarchical control and market governance. Network 
governance involves policies that link different stakeholder organizations (e.g. through incentives such as 
subsidies) around a public policy purpose and a set of joint goals (Mayne et al, 2013). This type of 
governance is, according to Burns and Koster (2016) considered to be more effective as networks are 
more flexible than the traditional hierarchical organization of the state and therefore fit the dynamics of 
‘liquid modernity’. They reference the work of Elinor Ostrom which has shown that, in the absence of 
strong central control and powerful market forces, local networks (under certain conditions) can more 
effectively solve shared problems. 
 
Díaz-Gibson et al (2014) provide examples of network governance in education and explain how 
community-based partnerships that provide comprehensive social, educational and health services have 
become an emergent strategy in Western countries to tackle complex educational challenges in child 
development. Educational collaborative networks, while still in their infancy, are gaining momentum in 
education as a reform strategy aimed at creating an interconnected approach to major educational issues, 
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such as persistent academic underperformance, students’ transition from school to work or childhood 
obesity. Specific examples are the networks of mainstream and special schools in the Netherlands, tasked 
to provide for inclusive education for all children in a specific region; or the Area Learning Communities, 
established across the Northern Ireland within which schools and colleges are working to increase the 
range of courses for pupils in the local area.  
 
The role of governments in such networks can, according to Theisens (in Burns and Koster, 2016) be 
twofold. They can either create the arena within which networks operate (e.g. establishing frameworks, 
formulating a strategic vision, facilitating knowledge and feedback and operating as a crowbar when 
participants in a network fail to cooperate effectively), or they can act as a player in the network 
(particularly at the local level) when working with schools, citizens and private partners to improve 
education.  
 
Government policy in England has particularly taken on the first role in incentivizing a range of school-
to-school partnerships, particularly the model of a ‘Multi-Academy Trust’ (MAT). The 2016 white paper 
sets out the government’s intention to move all England’s schools to become autonomous academies by 
2022, and all academies to become part of a Multi-Academy Trust (DfE, 2016). Academies are state-
funded schools, independent of local authority control; they are self-governing non-profit charitable trusts 
which may receive support from personal or corporate sponsors and have relatively large autonomy. By 
2015, nearly two-thirds of the 4,725 academies were in MATs and there are 517 MATs that had two to 
five academies, 98 with 6-15 and 19 with 16 or more. MATs are chains of schools where the Trust has a 
single funding agreement with the Secretary of State and each academy also has a supplemental funding 
agreement with the Secretary of State. All academies in a MAT are run by a single board of directors, 
although the board of directors may decide to delegate some functions to school-level governing bodies.  
 
The white paper ‘Educational Excellence Everywhere’ (DfE, 2016:57) states that: “MATs are the only 
structures which formally bring together leadership, autonomy, funding and accountability across a group 
of academies in an enduring way, and are the best long term formal arrangement for stronger schools to 
support the improvement of weaker schools.” The collaboration of schools, under the authority of a Trust, 
is thought to improve the quality of teaching and the richness of children’s learning. Academies within a 
Trust are expected to respond with greater flexibility to local context and to ensure more innovative and 
affordable services than schools operating on their own or under the authority of local or central 
government.  
 
The introduction of networks and network governance is profoundly changing the structure of education 
systems and the role of governments in school improvement reform. Hierarchical lines of decision-
making and control are rapidly being replaced by horizontal lines of organizing and decision-making 
which are much more diffuse, unclear and often lack a transparent structure (Theisens, in Burns and 
Koster, 2016). These changes similarly challenge traditional top down models of accountability, such as 
inspections of schools on a centralized framework, or league tables of student performance which 
evaluate single schools on a centrally defined framework and include intensive monitoring and sanctions 
to motivate schools to adhere to this framework. Top-down forms of accountability take little note of the 
position of schools within networks and the collaboration between schools towards a common purpose 
and discount the fact that collaboration involves lateral relationships which are built on non-hierarchical 
structures, often outside of central government. Centralized accountability arrangements may even be 
counterproductive to the aims and purposes of network governance, as the emphasis on individual 
agencies’ performance targets and budgets gets in the way of them working together and may hinder 
cross-cutting work. This paper offers an understanding of the types of accountability systems that are fit 
for network governance and can support effective partnerships. 
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Our contribution starts with an outline of the purpose of accountability of educational networks. We then 
continue with a reflection on the problematic nature of holding educational networks to account, while the 
final section will unpick the question of ‘who is accountable to whom and for what’ in a network of 
schools? From this section we will propose a conceptual framework of what accountability of educational 
networks may look like and what measurement models are relevant to capture the focus and functioning 
of educational networks and provide accurate feedback to network leaders and policy-makers. The 
example of English MATs will be used throughout the paper to contextualize our contribution, and we 
will therefore start with a clarification of these type of networks.  
2. Multi-Academy Trusts in England 
Academies are publicly funded independent schools. They must follow the law and guidance on 
admissions, exclusions and special education needs and disabilities, but benefit from greater freedomi. 
They can set pay and conditions for their staff, decide on how to deliver the curriculum and they have the 
ability to change the length of terms and set their own school hours.  
 
The first academies were established through an initiative from the Department of Education in 2002 to 
take over local authority-run schools where aspirations and achievement were deemed to be too low. 
Sponsors were appointed to take these so-called struggling schools out of local authority control and ‘turn 
them around’. These sponsor-led academies receive their funding directly from the Education Funding 
Agency and are accountable to state government. Start-up costs of these original sponsored academies 
were partly funded by private means, such as entrepreneurs or NGOs, with all running costs met by 
Central Government. In 2010, central government expanded the role of Academies in the Academies Act 
(2010), in which a wide number of schools in non-deprived areas were also encouraged to become 
Academies. These academies are referred to as ‘converter academies’. In addition, the government 
continued to encourage academy sponsors to take on under-performing schools, but there was no longer a 
requirement for non-governmental funding and the majority of new sponsors are now high performing 
schools, there are now over 4,500 open academies, including over half of all secondary schools in 
Englandii.  
 
Most of these academies are part of a Multi-Academy Trust (MAT) and run by a Trust. MATs are chains 
of schools where the Trust has a single funding agreement with the Secretary of State and each academy 
also has a supplemental funding agreement with the Secretary of State. All academies in the MAT are run 
by a single board of directors. Although the MAT may decide to delegate some functions to school-level 
governing bodies, the MAT remains accountable for the schools and can take all decisions on how the 
schools are runiii. Collaboration of schools within the Trust is regulated through schemes of delegation 
and terms of reference which outline roles and responsibilities and decision-making within the Trust. 
MATs are typical examples of what Klijn and Koppenjan (2014) describe as ‘mandated or goal-directed 
networks’. Such networks have, according to these authors, more stable patterns of social relations and 
deliberate structure in their interactions with organizational arrangements and rules, compared to the self-
initiated networks of legally autonomous organizations working together informally to achieve a 
collective goal.  
 
Under these formal governance structures, each academy retains a legally binding contract with the 
Secretary of State and their accountability is to both the Department for Education, through the 
monitoring of Regional Schools Commissioners and Ofsted inspections, as set within the network they 
are part of.  
 
Regional Schools Commissioners (RSCs) were introduced in 2014 to coordinate the setup of academies 
and MATs and monitoring their performance on behalf of the Department for Education. RSCs are 
responsible for the academies (and free schools, UTCs and studio schools) in their area and make 
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decisions on applications from schools wanting to become academies and organisations wanting to 
sponsor an academy. Each RSC is also responsible for one of the larger national academies (e.g. ARK, E-
ACT). Their main responsibilities are toiv: 
• monitor the performance of the academies in their area  
• take action when an academy is underperforming 
• decide on the creation of new academies 
• make recommendations to ministers about free school applications 
• encourage organisations to become academy sponsors (ensuring that there are enough high-quality 
sponsors to meet local need, ensuring each region has a strong supply of high quality sponsors) 
• proposing suitable sponsors for poorly performing maintained schools who have been selected by 
DfE to become sponsored academies. 
• approve changes to open academies, including: changes to age ranges, mergers between academies, 
changes to Multi-Academy Trust arrangements 
 
RSCs are particularly responsible for the oversight and monitoring of those academies which are in 
special measures or require improvement according to Ofsted. Where there is underperformance in an 
academy school or Trust, the Regional Schools Commissioner takes their authority from the funding 
agreement (the contract between the Secretary of State and the Trust). RSCs however only deal with 
breaches of the funding agreement on the grounds of failure to deliver a good quality education. Other 
potential breaches of funding agreements, such as conflicts of interest or financial mismanagement, are 
dealt with by the Education Funding Agency. The RSCs get support from headteacher boards (HTBs) 
which are made up of experienced academy headteachers in each region who advise and challenge RSCs. 
These headteachers are from outstanding academies and are elected by other academy headteachers in the 
region.  
3. The purpose of accountability of networks 
The shift towards network governance creates, according to Burns and Koster (2016), a complex 
education landscape with very real questions about which actors at which levels should be held 
accountable for which outcomes, and how this can function in a coherent and intelligent manner. The 
tension between tightly controlled accountability mechanisms which seek to minimise risk and error 
contradicts the fundamental purpose of network governance to allow stakeholders to flexibly respond to 
local context and collaborate on the basis of trust. Several authors however also explain potential 
unintended consequences of networks which necessitates the accountability of networks.  
 
Mayne and Rieper (2003) for example talk about how collaboration and networking may cause members 
of a network, such as academies and teachers and head teachers working in those academies, to lose sight 
of the public objectives they are serving. The complexity of managing the network and the partnership 
arrangement may push the public interest aside and create a range of opportunistic behaviours. Greany 
and Ehren (2016) provide examples of MATs refusing to take on the most challenging schools and 
students in order to enhance their performance, while Ofsted (England’s Inspectorate of Education) has 
repeatedly commented on the excessive salaries of top executives at some of England's biggest academy 
chains (BBC, 10 March 20161). 
 
Apart from preventing adverse effects of networking, accountability also has a role in bringing order in 
the relations between partners and preventing fragmented collaboration. Networks generally face a range 
of problems, according to Mayne and Rieper (2003), and Janssens (2015), such as: 
                                                     
1 http://www.bbc.com/news/education-35775458 
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- Diffusion of roles and responsibilities with limited clarity over where to complain or who to approach 
when things go wrong. Hutching et al’s (2014) study, for example, found that there is limited clarity 
over who sponsors MATs; they had great difficulty in finding organisations or individuals who take 
responsibility for school performance within a chain.  
- Competition between partners in the network over delivery of services when partners are trying to 
deliver different services to the same clientele and have some home-based loyalties and preferential 
knowledge in delivering those services. As Gray and Jenkins (2003) explain, stakeholders drawn into 
collaborative arrangements rarely relinquish their own organizational agendas for the collective good 
of the network but rather battle to impose their own values on the overall goals of the enterprise.  
Such issues are reported by Greany and Ehren (2016) for MATs. According to these authors, new 
Trusts often face cultural challenges where senior education leaders of single schools, who are used to 
‘running their own ship’, now have to work in matrix-like structures where finance, HR and marketing 
professionals are employed by the trust, and have to adhere to and work within the framework set by 
these centralized services.  This creates tensions which need to be resolved for the partnership to be 
effective.  
- Issues around service users who do not want to be associated with other users served by the same 
network organisation, such as when pupils going to mainstream schools do not want to be identified 
with students from a special needs school, or when head teachers of high performing schools do not 
want to be associated with a failing school in the Trust.  
- Challenges in having multiple partners in the delivery of services determine success criteria for their 
services and potential conflicts, coordination difficulties and costs, management complexities and 
power issues about deciding on, and reaching common goals.  
Greany and Ehren (2016) for example talk about head teachers and teachers feeling disempowered by 
having to work within centralized structures of scripted curricula and lesson plans, particularly in large 
MATs where the CEO tries to ensure control over schools through hierarchical governance. Hill 
(Academies Commission, 2013) notes that the imposition of a centrally-mandated model on academies 
in the Trust reduces school and teacher autonomy and constrains headteachers in developing 
innovative practices. Some head teachers also report that much of the support from centralized staff 
goes to schools who are failing to meet the targets set in Ofsted’s inspection framework (and are 
designated as ‘requiring improvements’ or ‘in special measures’), where good and outstanding schools 
are either expected to fend for themselves or see their resources (e.g. teachers, teaching assistants) 
taken out of their school to support their poorly performing peers. 
- Convergence toward groupthink when members of the network isolate themselves from outside 
influences and suppress conflicting viewpoints when making decisions. Groupthink is a potential risk 
in MATs that expect their schools to implement one and the same organizational model, and 
implement the same curriculum and assessment practices. Such centralized decision-making and 
frameworks potentially create a situation in which member schools are not encouraged to think and act 
independently and develop innovative solutions for local problems.  
- Inefficiencies due to participant turnover and communication and meeting costs, such as when 
academies change membership of a Trust and have to set new working routines under a new Trust, or 
when large MATs introduce multiple layers of management (e.g. executive heads in charge of specific 
regions) to coordinate schools in the Trust and top slice schools’ budgets to finance these layers. 
 
Theisen (in Burns and Koster, 2016) also states that we still understand relatively little about how order is 
created in complex networks and how networks can contribute to a more effective education system. As 
the current education landscape in England is moving towards full academization where all schools are 
expected to become part of a MAT, the risk of creating an ineffective and inefficient system becomes a 
real one which needs to be addressed through the introduction of external accountability of Trusts.  
 
 6 
 
4. Problematic accountability of networks 
Developing accountability frameworks to capture the performance of networks is however not an easy 
task. Several authors (Mayne, 2003; Schwartz, 2003; Janssens and Ehren, 2016) talk about the 
problematic nature of accountability of networks, pointing to the diffuse and ambiguous nature of 
collaborative arrangements, the changing (contribution of members to) network-level outcomes, and the 
sometimes conflicting expectations of stakeholder and client groups. In this section we will reflect on 
these problems before describing the frameworks that can be used to hold networks accountable for their 
performance and functioning.  
 
Diffuse and ambiguous nature of networks 
Mayne (2003) explains how networks are often diffuse and ambiguous in nature with changing 
arrangements for collaboration and decision-making when partners move in and out of the network. 
Informal networks in particular have no agreements among partners in place on governance and 
financing, no common objectives tied to a public policy purpose and no shared governance to inform the 
external accountability framework. The partners in an informal network often join up for a specific 
purpose, such as to peer review each other’s work or to jointly develop a new set of assessments, 
dismantling or leaving the network when the purpose is met or collaboration is no longer opportune. 
Often there is no or a limited record or database of these networks, their purpose and their members 
which leads them to be largely out of scope of any external accountability exercise.  
However, even formal networks will see changes over time which will challenge their external 
accountability. Many of the MATs in England, for example, have grown rapidly over the last ten years 
and have changed their structure accordingly, particularly in putting in place a stronger infrastructure, 
with clear schemes of delegation and oversight, for example through Regional or Phase Directors, and a 
more professional approach to back office services (Greany and Ehren, 2016). MATs have also seen 
changes in their portfolio of schools where some schools have decided to join other partnerships, or where 
the Trust itself has decided to concentrate its work in specific regions.  
 
Changes are a common feature of networks, according to Mayne (2003) as partnership work goes hand in 
hand with compromise and negotiation where partners try to work towards a magnitude of outcomes, and 
try to find the most effective way to share decision-making authority, risks, resources and benefits of the 
partnership arrangement. As a result, networks will have diffuse and changing arrangements around 
collaboration, with roles and responsibilities that are changing and sometimes difficult to track. These 
changing structures and modes of collaboration complicate how organizations are held to account and 
raise difficult questions about ‘who is accountable to whom and for what’? 
 
Changing (contribution of members to) network-level outcomes 
The dynamics of collaboration also have an impact on the objective of the network and the purpose of 
partners’ collaboration. As Schwartz (2003) explains, the aims and objectives of networks are often not 
centrally defined, but result from collaborative efforts and fragile compromises between partners with 
different political, social and economic aims. Most schools in the network will be ill at ease with being 
held to account for something they don’t have complete control over, and traditional top down models of 
accountability will have great difficulty in disentangling how being in the network has impacted on the 
performance of its individual members, or to what extent each member has contributed to network-level 
outcomes.  
In England, the funding agreement between the Department of Education and single academies and their 
Trust, as well as the scheme of delegation within the Trust are the main instruments to clarify the roles 
and responsibilities for network-level outcomes. The agreements and delegation schemes set out the lines 
of accountability and how power structures are organized, which allows the Department for Education, as 
well as Ofsted and the Regional Schools Commissioner, who monitor the performance of academies and 
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Trusts, to understand the structure of a MAT and the school's position within it, the purpose of the 
collaboration and where responsibilities lie when the purpose is not met. The Department for Education 
endorses a clear networking arrangement by only approving funding agreements with single academies 
and their Trust which show clear lines of accountability, where the Trust has a transparent scheme of 
delegation in place which sets out which powers of the MAT’s board of directors will be delegated to 
local governing bodies.  
 
However, network objectives and structures for collaboration to meet those objectives often change over 
time as partners leave the network, new partners with new goals join the network or the external 
environment of the network evolves. Government reforms in England have, for example, seen proposals 
to introduce a new legal framework for an all academy system, a move to a more skills-focused school 
governance system, and changes to the transfer of land when community schools convert to academy 
status. These changes will create new opportunities or trivialize some of the network’s purposes and ways 
of collaboration. Changes in membership can however only be formalized when funding agreements 
expire after seven years, unless schools are underperforming and are being rebrokered. Schemes of 
delegation on the other hand can be revised more flexibly throughout this seven-year period.  
 
Expectations of client and stakeholder groups 
A third complicating factor in the accountability of networks are the expectations of the network’s various 
client and stakeholder groups. Schwartz (2003) and Mayne and Rieper (2003) explain how each partner in 
a network has its own client and stakeholder groups (e.g. parents and students) who will have different 
objectives and aims for the service they are receiving. Through their choice of schools, or ‘voting with 
their feet’ they also have the means to evaluate, reward or punish the network member that is delivering 
their service, creating a complex set of accountability relationships where members in the network will 
have to satisfy and negotiate a multitude of conflicting interests. Networks that serve a highly 
heterogeneous group of clients and stakeholders with views that are different to the purpose of the 
network will again have difficulty in answering the question of ‘who is accountable to whom and for 
what’?  
5. Accountability of networks 
Burns and Koster (2016) argue for strong accountability that explicitly acknowledges this kind of 
complexity and uses a constructive approach which balances regulation and evaluation with excellence 
and equality. According to these authors, accountability systems need to keep a clear focus on 
achievement and excellence while being nuanced enough to allow for innovation, creativity and a 
rounded learning experience. An important question is therefore how accountability mechanisms can be 
designed to strengthen the maturing of networks and support their collaboration to improve outcomes, 
while similarly preventing potential adverse effects of collaboration.  
 
Localized approach to evaluation 
<Authors> have used Alkin’s (2013) framework of evaluation theories to suggest specific examples of 
methodology, judgements and user focus and involvement in holding educational networks to account, for 
example by Inspectorates of Education. Their model includes a qualitative, interpretative and flexible 
approach of validating good practices of localized and collaborative provision and improvement of 
education, such as through the use of ‘developmental evaluation’ or ‘participatory evaluation’. In 
<authors> proposed model, Inspectorates of Education facilitate evaluations which are goal-free, flexible 
and specific to context and information needs of (network of) schools and stakeholders. Network 
members and their stakeholders are involved in all the phases of the accountability exercise, from 
developing the standards and methods for evaluation, to deciding on how to improve the performance of 
the network and potential consequences for failure. Such an approach allows Inspectorates of Education 
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to engage network members and their stakeholders in making constant judgements about what type of 
behaviour is effective and appropriate in which settings and allows for a deep understanding of how 
networks operate and are effective in solving local problems. Their facilitation of evaluation and 
inspection, instead of making judgements on a centralized framework, respects the specific purpose of 
different networks, while similarly bringing order to the diffuse and sometimes ambiguous nature of 
collaborative arrangements.  
 
Multiple levels of evaluation and outcomes 
Networks have multiple layers of practice and outcomes which need to be clarified when deciding on who 
is accountable to whom and for what. Popp et al’s (2013) provide a framework to analyse outcomes of 
networks, in which they distinguish outcomes on the individual, organisational, network and community 
level. Outcomes on the individual level include, according to Popp et al (2013), an assessment of the 
impact of the network on the individuals who interact in the network on behalf of their respective 
organizations and on individual clients, and equally also the contribution of individuals to network-level 
outcomes. Such outcomes would typically be addressed in performance management schemes and annual 
staff development reviews, such as when head teachers observe and discuss the quality of lessons of 
individual teachers, and discuss the conditions (support and resources) within which (head) teachers are 
working.  
 
The organisational level is about the performance of member organisations, such as the schools in a Trust, 
their contribution to network-level outcomes and how their performance is conditioned by the network 
they are part of. Accountability frameworks (both internal and external) are particularly organized to 
measure outcomes of network members, such as through internal school-evaluation, peer review, school 
inspections or high stakes testing and the publication of league tables, but the focused inspections and 
MAT review have started to question how performance of schools is influenced by the Trust they are part 
of, particularly the support they receive for school improvement. There is however little scrutiny over the 
contribution of schools to the performance of the network, other than an evaluation of how supportive 
schools are of other schools. 
 
Network-level outcomes are those we introduced at the start, and the raison d'être for the collaboration 
between organisations and individuals within those organisations. These joint efforts and network-level 
outcomes are categorized by Gray et al (2003) who describe three common purposes for networks where 
the creation of synergy and the enhancement of financial efficiency are particular aims of MATs.  
Synergy is created when the partnership adds value by combining mutually reinforcing interests. Most of 
the MATs will have this purpose as their central aim is, according to Hutchings et al (2014), for member 
schools (particularly failing ones) to benefit from the support and expertise of their sponsor and from 
other member schools in the network. Schools in a Trust can benefit from membership by maximizing 
curriculum range, sharing playgrounds, or sharing professional development. Burgess (2016) refers to two 
models currently used; one of vertical integration which sees secondary schools joining with a primary 
school, or horizontal integration where schools join with another school in the same sector to form a 
MAT. Synergy can be found, according to Burgess (2016) in strengthening parental engagement, where 
parents are firstly engaged with schools and keep their child in the MAT throughout their primary and 
secondary education, making secondary school intake more reliable, or saving staff-time in fundraising if 
both the primary and secondary school staff engage in alumni fundraising and students only become 
alumni upon graduating from their secondary school. Benefits of horizontal integration are re-balancing 
of curriculum offerings between the two schools, while staff career pathways internally can also be 
broadened.  
Enhancing financial efficiency is also an important purpose for MATs. According to Burgess (2016), 
MATs can maximize the use of resources across the member schools or generate extra resources, such as 
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through value for money procurement, back-office savings, or using school and classroom infrastructure 
across a number of schools. 
 
An evaluation of outcomes on the community level would look at the contribution of the network to the 
community it serves, such as improving employment rates within a region or enhancing social cohesion. 
The current accountability framework of MATs largely ignores these outcomes, but examples of area-
wide evaluations and inspections would capture such outcomes.  
Table 1 summarizes these four outcomes and provides examples for MATs. 
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Table 1: Levels of analysis in inter-organizational network evaluation (adapted from Popp et al., 2013, p. 
70) 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Description of outcomes Example outcomes for MATs 
Individual Assessment of the impact that the network has on 
the individuals who interact in the network on 
behalf of their respective organisations and on 
individual clients, and the impact of the 
individual on the functioning and performance of 
the network  
- Quality of teaching and school 
leadership 
- Support from centralized staff 
of individual teachers and head 
teachers 
Organisation Assessment of the impact that the network has on 
the member organisations, and the contribution 
of network members to overall network 
effectiveness 
- School outcomes of individual 
schools and capacity to 
improve 
- Support from trust for school 
improvement (e.g. staff 
development) 
Network Assessment of the network itself can have a 
variety of foci (synergy, transformation, 
efficiency), many of which depend on the 
relative maturity of the network. The strengths of 
relationships across the network is an important 
focus, as well as the structure and purpose (e.g. 
network membership growth, relationship 
strengths, member commitment to network 
goals) 
- Improved transition between 
primary and secondary schools 
- Greater parental involvement 
throughout children’s school 
career 
- Efficiency of back office 
services 
Community  Assessment of the contributions that the network 
makes to the community it was established to 
serve 
- Improved employment rates 
within a community 
- Improved social cohesion 
- Decline in crime rates 
 
Accountability frameworks need to develop evaluation criteria and standards that reflect such purposes of 
the network and evaluate whether networks such as MATs add value, and are developed in ways which 
maximise their capacity to enhance collaboration between schools, to improve the quality of teachers and 
teaching and to enhance the richness of children’s learning and progress. Tracing network objectives and 
evaluating achievement towards those objectives will, according to Gray et al (2003), bring order to the 
potential complexity of relationships within the network and assess the value of these relationships in 
delivering the agreed standards of outcomes and means. Evaluation can, according to Gray et al (2003), 
also facilitate knowledge building and inform debates and choices about alternative forms of 
collaboration or ways to strengthen the partnership work. In such forms of accountability, measurement 
shifts from being a technique to determine the precise magnitude of things and to prove and judge the 
level of achieved performance to developing a thorough understanding of what a network is 
accomplishing.  
 
In England, the accountability of MATs is primarily organized through focused inspections and MAT 
reviews by the Education Inspectorate (Ofsted) and the monitoring of Regional Schools Commissioners 
(RSCs). The inspection handbook explains how focused inspections include coordinated visits to all the 
schools in a chain within a period of two weeks, and interviews with central staff of the Trust and where a 
letter is published on the strengths and weaknesses of schools across a Trust. These focused inspections 
and MAT reviews are however not common practice as there is no legislation or regulation in place to 
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task Ofsted with the inspections of MATs. Inspectors who lead on inspections of individual schools 
within a focused inspection will look for differences and common issues between schools in analysing 
questionnaires from students, parents and staff during inspection visits. Common issues across schools 
will be shared and discussed between the lead inspectors during the inspection week(s), particularly with 
a view to discuss any features that could lead to common areas for further improvement relating to the 
impact of the chain. There is no framework in place to assess and grade the support provided by the Trust 
or the effectiveness of its governance as Ofsted is, under current legislation, only allowed to inspect 
schools with a Unique Reference Number (URN). There are however informal, unpublished guidelines 
and standards in place for the MAT review. The following questions, which were included in the letter to 
the School Partnership Trust Academies (SPTA), provide an idea of the standards used during focused 
inspections and the MAT reviewv:  
 How well does SPTA understand the context, strengths and weaknesses of their academies?  
 How well does SPTA hold their academies to account? What structures are in place to do this? How 
is the improvement journey monitored? 
 How does SPTA challenge and support their academies?  
 What evidence is there of the impact of the Trust? 
 
These questions are also asked during inspections of single schools in interviews for which 
representatives of the Trust are invited. Collaborative development is now also an important part of 
inspection judgements of single school quality. As the inspection handbook outlines, school leadership 
can only be judged to be outstanding when a contribution to system-wide improvement can be evidenced, 
and reducing the frequency of inspection visits if inspectors’ quality assurance of a school’s self-
evaluation demonstrates it is sound and underpinned by rigorous external peer review (see also Ofsted 
report ‘Unseen Children’).  
 
The Regional Schools Commissioners (RSC) have an important role in the set up and monitoring of 
academies and MATs. They deal with breaches of the funding agreement on the grounds of failure to 
deliver a good quality education, which is defined as academies which are: 
 not meeting key stage 2 or key stage 4 floor standards, 
 on a downwards trajectory,  
 or judged to be inadequate by Ofsted. 
The monitoring of academies and their Trust is also by more informal arrangements (or ‘soft 
intelligence’), such as meetings between the Regional Schools Commissioner and his/her board of head 
teachers from the region, and conversations with the Local Authority. There is no framework for 
monitoring and supporting of failing schools by the RSCs, but the education select committee’s recent 
inquiry into MATs (and the interview with the national schools commissioner, David Carter2) suggests 
the use of a ‘health check’ which looks at school standards and the Trust’s track record of improvement, 
particularly in improving the attainment of disadvantaged pupils. 
 
The 2013/2014 annual inspection report also describes how the RSCs have started to work with Ofsted’s 
regional directors in sharing knowledge about academies and their Trust. As the regional HMIs and 
Regional School Commissioners however cover different regions, this knowledge exchange is not 
straightforward.  
 
Accountable for what: functioning of networks to achieve outcomes 
Several authors also describe how networks can be organized effectively to achieve their intended 
outcomes. Research on effective school networks (West, 2010; CUREE centre, 2005; Muijs et al, 2010) 
                                                     
2 http://schoolsweek.co.uk/health-check-for-growing-academy-trusts-will-focus-on-standards-and-improvement/ 
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indicates that effective networks have specific structural features (governance structure, size, 
geographical spread), as well as effective relations between individuals and schools in the network 
(reciprocity, continuity and regularity of interaction, transparency, trust etc).  
 
According to Provan and Kenis (2008), governance structures need to be adapted to relational 
contingencies in the network to be effective. These authors explain how larger networks will struggle to 
have effective forms of bottom-up shared governance as members will either ignore critical network 
issues or spend large amounts of time trying to coordinate across 10, 20, or more organizations, 
particularly when participants are spread out geographically. Larger networks often also face problems 
with the distribution of trust across the network and with ensuring goal consensus. Such large networks 
are therefore more effective, according to Provan and Kenis (2008) with brokered forms of network 
governance, where a separate administrative entity governs the network and its activities. Shared 
governance is most likely to be effective when trust is pervasive throughout the network and provides a 
strong basis for bottom-up collaboration among network members. Bottom-up initiated collaboration 
among all members is, according to Provan and Kenis (2008), less essential in more centralized networks 
where a lead organization coordinates collaboration through dyadic ties with individual members.  
 
Evaluating the structural and relational contingencies of networks enhances our understanding of how 
networks can be improved to more effectively fulfil their purpose; it also allows us to understand which 
network configurations are developing across the education system to improve outcomes overall.  
 
As the previous section indicated, the accountability framework of MATs in England particularly 
addresses the collaboration between schools and support of the Trust, and emphasizes clarity and 
transparency in schemes of delegation and organizational structure and decision-making. There is 
however little notion of the interplay between structure and relations and how these impact on network-
level outcomes. Relevant questions for the design of such frameworks are, according to Popp et al. (2013, 
p. 68): 
- Does the network have a clear vision and goals that are understood and supported by all members?  
- Is the governance structure a good fit for this network? 
- Is the network appropriately resourced to do its work? 
- Does the leadership style fit with what we know about effective network leadership? 
- Are important management tasks being attended to, and is the management focus evolving 
appropriately over time?  
- Is attention being paid to both the management of the network, and management in the network?  
- Does the network have both the internal and the external legitimacy it requires? 
- Is the network/relationship structure evolving as expected and contributing positively to the work of 
the network?  
- Is there an optimal mix of strong and weak ties among network members?  
- Are the linkages targeted and appropriate? 
- Is there trust among network members? 
- Are power differentials being recognized and addressed as appropriate?  
- Are there multiple levels of involvement? 
- Is there a balance of stability and flexibility?  
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Network-internal mechanisms of quality control 
The previous sections proposed a framework for the accountability of networks, putting the specific 
outcomes of the network and their structural and relational configuration at the heart of the accountability 
exercise. Even though networks members and their stakeholders play an important role in setting the 
standards and informing the evaluation, in our proposed framework national government continues to be 
in charge of the accountability of networks. Hooge et al (2012) however emphasize the need for more 
horizontal and professional forms of accountability where relevant stakeholders have a fruitful dialogue 
about decisions, performance, expectations and judgements and build the capacity to effectively engage in 
such processes themselves. Aviram (2003) and Mandell and Keast (2007) write about four quality control 
mechanisms of mature networks which provide a helpful framework to understand such professional 
accountability in the context of educational networks.  
  
The first mechanism is the collection and dissemination of information on the credibility and quality of 
network partners. Such an information mechanism facilitates independent decisions on the contribution of 
members of the network-to-network level outcomes and allows the network to make informed decisions 
on improving collaboration or centralized support services, or decisions on excluding partners who act 
opportunistically, degrade the overall performance of the network, or destroy the reputation of the 
network. Peer reviews between schools within MATs, and reviews of the quality of central services are 
examples of an information mechanism. Such reviews can provide information on whether schools act 
opportunistically by admitting only students from privileged backgrounds, whether the performance of 
the entire network is degraded when the network has too many failing schools requiring high levels of 
support from central staff, causing a decline in the performance of well performing schools and damaging 
the reputation of the Trust. 
 
Mature networks also have formal and transparent procedures in place to exclude opportunistic or failing 
partners (‘exclusion mechanism’) or to replace ineffective transactions and collaboration with more 
effective ones (referred to as a ‘switching mechanism’), according to Aviram (2003). In England, the 
exclusion mechanism operates through the RSCs who are in charge of removing schools from a Trust or 
rebrokering schools into other Trusts after the funding agreement expires. Several authors (Hill, 2008, 
2013; Greany and Ehren, 2016) argue for greater clarity in these procedures, particularly of the criteria 
used to re-broker schools, and also for shorter timelines of funding agreements (from seven to five years) 
to allow academies to change networks more easily.  
 
A fourth mechanism to control and improve quality within networks is ‘control’. The control mechanism 
includes the centralized control of transacting facilities and other members’ assets between schools in the 
network and centralized offices. Particularly, large MATs have such strong centralized control in place in 
the form of central staff providing services to member schools (e.g. HR, finances, operations, professional 
development). They sometimes also control and regulate the teaching and learning in schools, such as by 
prescribing curricula, lesson plans, time tables and assessment schemes. These services are paid for by top 
slicing a percentage of the schools’ budgets.  
 
These mechanisms are important for the stability and the performance of the network and its long term 
survival. They support the development of successful collaboration where collaboration between partners 
leads to the creation of a new organizational form that exists by itself, independently from the network 
partners and where network participants feel they are part of a whole and no longer only loyal to their 
‘home school’ or pressured to ensure only their own school is performing well. Accountability 
frameworks which evaluate and reinforce the functioning of these mechanisms, as well as the fit between 
structural and relational contingencies of the network will be more effective in ensuring these networks 
meet their intended outcomes on the longer term (see Mandell and Keast, 2007).   
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Towards an accountability framework for networks 
In this paper we explained how many governments are moving towards ‘network governance’ to 
coordinate their education system in an attempt to address the limitations of centralized policy. We argued 
that traditional forms of top down accountability, such as through inspections of schools on a centralized 
framework, are no longer relevant in such systems as they take little note of the position of schools within 
networks and the collaboration between schools towards a common purpose. Our paper offered a 
conceptual framework to understand relevant forms of external accountability of educational networks 
which use a more localized approach of validating good (network) practice and outcomes, evaluating 
outcomes on the individual, organizational, network and community level and an understanding of the 
structural and relational contingencies of the network in meeting these outcomes. We also argued for four 
internal mechanisms of quality control which should inform the internal/professional accountability of the 
network.  
 
Throughout the paper we have provided an example of the accountability of MATs in England. MATs are 
mandated networks, governed by a lead organization. These types of networks are relatively stable and 
goal-directed and the question of ‘who is accountable for what and to whom’ is therefore relatively 
straightforward to answer compared to the accountability of informal, self-initiated networks that are 
more fluent and subject to change. Our example highlighted how MATs are particularly held accountable 
on the outcomes of each individual member school, with limited accountability on the individual, network 
or community level. Outcomes include indicators of (individual) school performance, as well as the 
collaboration between schools and the functioning of the Trust in supporting school improvement. The 
framework used by Ofsted and the RSCs is fairly standardized with limited flexibility in looking at 
specific outcomes of MATs or having MATs and their stakeholders set the agenda for the accountability 
exercise.  
 
Such a standardized approach excludes the more flexible approaches discussed in this paper and which 
were considered to support networks that operate in situations of high uncertainty where network 
members are dealing with unpredictable and risky situations. As Klijn et al (2010) explain, in those 
situations actors do not know what to expect and how other actors will behave; in their search for new 
products or innovative processes, they cannot foresee what the outcome will be, and the risk of investing 
in such a process is high because of the potential misuse of information or ‘cherry picking’ by other 
network members. The benefits of collaboration are unclear and difficult to estimate beforehand and 
engaging in external accountability will add additional risks, particularly when a standardized frameworks 
minimizes differences between network members and limit the confrontation of different ideas and 
expertise. Sydow (2004) therefore warns against formalized evaluation, particularly of new networks that 
still need to develop high trust relationships to deal with the uncertainty of their collaboration.  
 
<authors> additionally argue that external accountability of networks operating in situations of high 
uncertainty can only really work if the education system in which they function is characterized by high 
levels of reciprocal trust. In such a context, accountability becomes a tool for learning and improvement 
instead of control; dissolving boundaries between schools and other relevant providers in the area, the 
Inspectorate of Education and policy-makers and ensuring that the goal of ‘good education; is a shared 
responsibility and endeavour. In such a context, network members can respond quickly to local problems, 
professionally scrutinize and share local solutions and ensure that school collaboration is not just an ‘end 
in itself’ but successfully contributes to improvement of education and student outcomes, even in 
challenging circumstances.  
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